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child care are the most important variables of those analyzed. The functioning of the 
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1. Introduction 
Kuznets’ (1955) pioneering work laid the foundation for explaining the long-term 
influence of economic growth on income distribution. His hypothesis envisages that the 
extent of a country’s development determines the degree of income inequality, as 
related by an inverted U-shape. Although this hypothesis prevailed until the late 70s, it 
is currently under challenge. Specifically, there is a lack of consensus in the empirical 
literature on the validity of said hypothesis (Milanovic, 1994; Fields, 2001, among 
many others). Fields (2001) notes that the determining factor to explain the degree of 
inequality is not the growth phase a country is experiencing, but rather the type of 
growth present in said economy. Additionally, other factors aside from economic 
development have also been found to affect inequality, such as education, public 
policies and the functioning of the labor market. The incorporation of these factors into 
the analysis has given rise to an entire set of literature on the so-called augmented 
Kuznets hypothesis (Milanovic, 1994). 
In parallel fashion, and based on the work by Roemer (1993) and Van de Gaer 
(1993), among others, a new field has developed around the concept of inequality of 
opportunity (IO). This field highlights how total inequality is, in reality, a combination 
of various types of inequalities: of opportunity, of effort and, perhaps less importantly, 
of luck (Lefranc et al., 2009). IO refers to those factors that are beyond individual 
control. These factors are referred to as circumstances, and relate to individuals’ social 
roots, such as race, their parents’ education and occupation, gender, place of birth, and 
so on.
2 As for effort inequality, this involves factors that are under the control of the 
individual, such as the number of hours worked, occupational choice, etc. It is important 
to distinguish between the various components of inequality, since the factors that 
determine it and their effect on the economy can be different. Along these lines, the 
World Bank (2006), Bourguignon et al. (2007a) and Marrero and Rodríguez (2010), 
have noted that IO, in addition to being the one inequality that is truly important from 
the standpoint of social justice, could exert a negative effect on growth. In this respect, 
and as applied to the economy of the United States, Marrero and Rodríguez (2010) have 
found that the impact of IO on growth is negative, while the effect of effort inequality is 
                                                            
2 There is an alternative concept of inequality of opportunity that alludes to the degree of meritocracy 
(Lucas, 1995; Arrow et al., 2000). This notion regards individuals as being completely responsible for 
their income (or their health, utility, job, etc.), as a result of which total inequality is due exclusively to 
the disparity of personal choices. We see, therefore, that meritocracy is an extreme case of our concept of 
IO, in which there are no circumstances.    3
positive. If this result is confirmed, correcting a country’s IO would not only result in a 
fairer society in terms of social equality, but it would also spur economic efficiency and 
growth. 
In keeping with the above, and along the lines set out by Kuznets (1955) and 
Milanovic (1994), an understanding of the factors that explain IO and separating them 
from the determinants of aggregate inequality is fundamental to properly devising 
public policies. The ultimate goal of this paper is precisely that of studying these 
determining factors. Specifically, the purpose of our analysis is two-fold. First, we aim 
to obtain homogeneous estimates of IO for the main European countries. To this end, 
we use the statistics of the Survey on Income, Social Inclusion and Living Conditions in 
Europe (EU-SILC database). Our analysis focuses on the 2005 cross-section for 23 
countries, this being the only one containing information on circumstances such as 
parents’ occupation and education. 
The second goal is to characterize the differences in IO among European 
countries based on factors related to the degree of economic development, the labor 
market, education, social protection and the tax structure. Taking as our reference the 
explanatory variables considered by Perugini and Martino (2008) in their paper on the 
determinants of income inequality among European regions, we study the explanatory 
capacity of a set of factors on IO and their differences with respect to total inequality. In 
this regard, we are aware of the limitations of our analysis in terms of the number of 
observations (a cross-section of 23 observations) resulting from the use of country data 
instead of regional data. Our objective, however, is to study those variables that, on a 
national level, have caused a greater or lesser level of IO so as to enable us to offer 
conclusions on economic policy at the national level. Moreover, numerous educational, 
labor and fiscal policies (both taxes and expenditures) are set at the national level. Also, 
the database used for this paper is probably the best currently available for obtaining a 
homogeneous estimate of IO for a broad range of countries. 
Our main findings are as follows. First, as with previous studies (Roemer et al., 
2003 and Rodríguez, 2008), we find that, in general, the Nordic countries have a lower 
IO, while Mediterranean countries have a greater IO. Central European countries 
occupy a central position, while those in Eastern Europe exhibit a broad range of IO. 
Secondly, the relationship between development and IO is negative and clearer than that 
between development and total inequality. Economic development is thus more   4
propitious to reduce IO than to reduce aggregate inequality. Thirdly, the aggregate 
variables of the labor market, such as employment or unemployment rates, have a very 
slight effect on IO. Variables that reflect the structure of the labor market, such as 
female employment rates, long-run unemployment rates or the difference between 
unemployment rates based on educational level have a greater influence on IO than 
aggregate variables. The effect of labor market variables on inequality is also 
ambiguous. Fourthly, the level of secondary education attained by individuals, and 
particularly dropout rates, has a significant effect on total inequality, although it is much 
more important on IO. According to our findings, avoiding dropouts and ensuring 
instruction through at least the secondary education level are the two most relevant 
aspects to reduce IO.  
Fifthly, spending on social protection in its various forms helps to reduce 
disparity of opportunity. Among the various expenditure items, those that most help to 
explain the differences noted in IO are social protection expenditure against social 
exclusion and child care and, to a lesser extent, on health care. As for disability benefits, 
this is only significant in terms of total inequality, while unemployment and retirement 
benefits are not significant for any type of inequality. Sixthly, we note that the effect of 
the tax structure on IO, after accounting for public spending on social benefits, is 
negative for indirect taxes, and positive for direct taxes, although the extent of the 
significance is called into question once an analysis of robustness is performed. Lastly, 
we note the considerable differences among the factors that help to explain the 
differences in IO and aggregate inequality among countries, especially for the education 
and social protection spending variables, meaning that redistribution policies that favor 
global inequality do not necessarily favor IO. 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the database used to 
measure IO in Europe, the methodology employed and the estimates found for IO. 
Section 3 offers a review of previous research into determinants of inequality. Section 4 
strives to improve our understanding of the factors (labor market, education and policy) 
that explain the differences noted in IO in Europe. In Section 5 we consider the 
robustness of our results. Finally, Section 6 offers some public policy recommendations 
based on our findings. 
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2. Data, methodology and IO in Europe 
In the first part of this section we present the database used to calculate IO in Europe. 
We then comment on the methodology employed before discussing our findings in the 
third part. 
 
2.1. The EU-SILC European database 
The availability of suitable data is crucial to a rigorous study of IO. The database must 
contain not only information on the income available to individuals, but also 
information on the individuals’ social roots or circumstances.
3 Unfortunately, there are 
few databases with this information, and even then, the number of circumstances tends 
to be limited.  
The database used in this paper is the EU Survey on Income, Social Inclusion 
and Living Conditions, or EU-SILC. This survey is only recently implemented (in 
2004), and only the data for 2005 is of use for our purposes, since this is the only year 
for which information is available on the occupation and level of education of parents, 
these variables being the most widely used in the related literature to measure IO (see, 
for example, Roemer et al., 2003, Checchi and Peragine, 2005, Bourguignon et al., 
2007b, Lefranc et al., 2008, Rodríguez, 2008 and Ferreira and Gignoux, 2008). An 
initial benefit of this survey is that it offers information for a large number of countries 
(26 total), which gives its database sufficient heterogeneity in terms of economic 
features and public policies. The countries we use are: Germany, Austria, Belgium, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, 
the Netherlands, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
the United Kingdom and Sweden.
4 A second advantage is the considerable number of 
circumstances it contains. For our study, we use the educational levels and occupations 
of both parents, the origin (national, European or rest of the world) of the individual 
and, lastly, a qualitative variable that measures the prevalent economic conditions in the 
individual’s home during his/her childhood. 
                                                            
3 For example, the studies presented in http://www.econ.umn.edu/~fperri/Cross.html consider databases 
with information on individual incomes, but without information on individual circumstances. 
4 The EU-SILC database also contains information on Luxembourg, Iceland and Cyprus, though we opted 
not to use these countries due to the peculiarities they pose and to their small size.   6
The variable used to calculate inequality is the equivalent income for those 
households whose head is between 26 and 50 years of age.
5 This way, we consider the 
cohorts with the highest proportion of employed persons and avoid the composition 
effect (individuals with different ages are in different phases of the wage-earning time 
series) while approaching the concept of permanent income (Grawe, 2005). In terms of 
the IO calculation, it must be noted that the circumstance vector observed is, by 
definition, a subset of the vector of all possible circumstances. The estimated IO values, 
then, will be a lower-bound of the true IO, and will increase with the number of 
circumstances observed (Ferreira and Gignoux, 2009).
6 That is why, when measuring 
IO, it is important that a database containing sufficient information on the individuals’ 
circumstances be employed. It is worth noting that, to the best of our knowledge, the 
2005 EU-SILC database features the highest number of individual circumstances 
measured homogeneously for a large number of countries. 
 
2.2.  Methodology for computing  IO 
The modern economy of justice recognizes that an individual’s income is a function of 
the effort exerted and of individual’s initial circumstances.
7 Individuals are only 
responsible for their efforts, however, since the circumstances are beyond their control. 
The first hurdle is defining the difference between effort and circumstances. To do this, 
we assume that society has reached a political agreement on the list of circumstances. A 
second hurdle is how to compare the results obtained by different individuals. This is 
done by grouping individuals according to circumstances and then comparing 
individuals under different circumstances. The final step is computing a policy for 
assigning resources among groups of circumstances. 
                                                            
5 The equivalence scale used in this paper is the same as that used in the EU-SILC database. Specifically, 
the equivalence scale is        13 14 3 . 0 ) 1 ( 5 . 0 1 N N e , where   14 N  is the number of household members 
14 years of age or older and   13 N  is the number of household members 13 years of age or younger. 
6 This problem is not unique to a study of IO, however, and is seen in practically every field of 
economics. For example, an analysis of salary discrimination must face the problem of a heterogeneity 
that is not explained by the individual characteristics observed. Worse yet, econometric modeling 
normally introduces a random variable to somehow account for all non-observed variables. 
7 See, among others, Roemer (1993, 1996, 1998 and 2002), Van de Gaer (1993), Fleurbaey (1995 and 
2008), O’Neill et al. (2000), Van de Gaer et al. (2001), Roemer et al. (2003), Ruiz-Castillo (2003), 
Peragine (2002 and 2004), Checchi y Peragine (2005), Betts and Roemer (2007), Moreno-Ternero (2007), 
Ooghe et al. (2007), Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2007), Bourguignon et al. (2007a and 2007b), Lefranc et 
al. (2008 and upcoming), Rodríguez (2008), Ferreira and Gignoux (2008) and Cogneau and Mesplé-
Somps (2009).   7
We now briefly describe the theory behind the calculation of IO. Assume a 
discrete population of individuals of size N, indexed by i  {1, …, N}. An individual’s 
income i, yi, is a function of his effort, ei, and of his circumstances, Ci:  ) , ( i i i e C f y  .
8 
Assume the effort is a continuous and one-dimensional variable, although its definition 
in vector terms would not change our analysis (Roemer, 1998). We also have a vector Ci 
of  J elements (circumstances) for each individual i. Finally, the circumstances are 
assumed to be exogenous while the effort exerted by the economic agents is influenced 
by, among other factors, the circumstances. The income of an individual i, then, is 
expressed as follows:  )) ( , ( i i i i C e C f y  . 
We now divide the population into M mutually exclusive and exhaustive groups 
(or types), Γ = {H1, …, HM}, where all the individuals in the same group m have the 
same circumstances: H1  H2  …  HM = {1, …, N},   Hr  Hs = ,   r and s, and  
Ci = Ck,  i and k |i  H m and k  H m ,  m. Moreover, we assume that the effort 
distribution for individuals of type m is 
m F  and that    
m e  represents the level of effort 
exerted by an individual in the 
th   quintile of that effort distribution, with  ] 1 , 0 [   . 
Given type m, we can then define the income level attained by the individual in the 
th  quintile as    )) ( (  
m m m e y v  . In this manner, the order of incomes and efforts 
within each type coincide since, for a particular type, the income will be determined 
exclusively by the effort.
9 In general, there is said to be equality of opportunity when an 
individual’s income is independent of his social origins (Bourguignon et al., 2007a and 
Lefranc et al., 2008). Strictly speaking, this would translate into the following 
condition:  
       k m
k m H H k m y F y F , , ), ( . (1) 
Once income distribution is available by types, we can contrast first and second 
order stochastic dominance by types. The stochastic dominance criterion, however, is 
partial and incomplete, since the distribution functions can cross (Atkinson, 1970). 
What is more, when the number of circumstances is large, the number of observations 
                                                            
8 Talent could be considered a circumstance, however, this variable is controversial as it might reflect past 
effort of a person (while being a child) and hence is not obviously something for which a person should 
not be held accountable. 
9 This property is equivalent to the strictly increasing axiom in the literature on IO (see O’Neill et al., 
2000).   8
per type will be small, which, in practice, precludes an estimate of the distribution 
functions. One alternative to using income distributions is considering a particular 
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1 1 ,   (2) 
the M-dimensional vector of average incomes for the various types. Each element of 
vector µ would be the expected income for each origin category or type. Then, in order 
to be equality of opportunity, a necessary (though not sufficient) condition is that the 
elements of vector µ be equal, that is: 
       k m
k m H H k m y y , , ), (   . (3) 
Taking the average vector as a reference, Van de Gaer (1993) proposed maximizing the 
minimum average income: 
     d v Min
m
m ) ( min ) (
1
0   . (4) 
Van de Gaer proposed using the minimum function to comply with the Rawlsian 
maximin principle. Many other authors, like Checchi and Peragine (2005), Moreno-
Ternero (2007), Rodríguez (2008) and Ferreira and Gignoux (2008) have proposed 
using an inequality index, such as the Gini or the Theil 0. One advantage of this 
proposal is that the calculation, by taking into account every element in the average 
vector µ, and not just its minimum element, would be less subject to extreme values. 
In summary, let χ be the space of joint income distributions and circumstances 
{y,  C} and  the space of possible divisions of the population; then, given   
   R IO   : , we have that 
) ( I IO   (5) 
is a measure of IO, where I is a specific inequality index. Of all the possible inequality 
indices that fulfill the basic principles found in the literature on inequality,
10 we chose 
the Generalized Entropy class of inequality indices which are additively decomposable 
                                                            
10 The principle of progressive transfers, symmetry, invariance to changes in scale and replication of the 
population (Cowell, 1995; Sen and Foster, 1997).   9
(Bourguignon, 1979; Shorrocks, 1980; Cowell, 1980). In particular, we select the mean 
logarithmic deviation, or Theil 0, T0,
  since it uses weights based on the groups’ 
population shares and has a path-independent decomposition (Foster and Shneyerov, 
2000).
11 The decomposition of this index into between-group and within-group 













0 0 0 ) ( ) ( ) (                      (6) 
where  n
m represents the population of type m. The between-group inequality index 
would be our IO index (actually, a lower bound of the IO), since the groups would be 
determined by the individual circumstances observed. As for the within-group 
inequality, this could be considered as that due to effort. However, we realize that it 
may contain other elements arising from non-observed circumstances and/or luck. That 
is why our analysis focuses on aggregate inequality and on the estimated IO. 
The between-group component can be non-parametrically estimated (Checchi 
and Peragine, 2005; Lefranc et al., 2008; Marrero and Rodríguez, 2010). However, this 
approach presents a drawback when the number of circumstances is high, as in our case, 
because this could result in a small number of observations by type, with the 
concomitant lack of accuracy in the estimated values. One way to avoid this problem is 
to use parametric techniques, like those proposed by Bourguignon et al. (2007b) and 
Ferreira and Gignoux (2008), which yield reliable estimates. We will now summarize 
this method. 
Parametric specifications rest on the assumption that the income of individual i 
is ) ), , ( , ( v u C e C f y i i i i  , where u and v represent random variables, like luck, as well 
as possible non-observed factors. If we now consider the reduced form of the above 
expression,  ) , (  C y   , we can estimate the log-linear equation using ordinary least 
squares (OLS): 
   C y ln .   (7) 
                                                            
11 The Theil 0 index is positively related to total inequality and has a value between 0 and ln(N), where N 














The remaining Generalized Entropy indices use weights based not only on the population shares of each 
type, but also on their income shares. These indices, then, place greater importance on high incomes.   10
Thus, once the within-group dispersion is accounted for, the OLS estimate would yield 
an approximation  ] exp[
 
   i i C  for the individual incomes. Based on the individual 








M    ,...,
1 , which is a 
parametric version of the vector µ. Lastly, we compute IO as  ) ( 0

  T IO . 
 
2.3. IO in Europe 
The IO estimates for the various EU countries are shown in Table 1 and Figure 1. Also 
shown are the standard error estimates given by the bootstrapping method using the 


























) (  ,                 (8) 
where R is the number of replicates.
12 To calculate the IO indices, we followed the 
methodology presented in the previous section, presenting the auxiliary regressions of 
(7) for each country in Appendix A.
13 Based on the results of these regressions, we see 
that, in general, the parents’ education has a positive influence on the children’s income, 
which increases with the educational level of the father and/or mother. Taking workers 
in the farming, forestry and fishing sectors as a reference, all of the remaining 
occupations, except for the elementary occupation, have a positive effect on the 
children’s incomes. On the other hand, having experienced financial difficulties in the 
household as a child, as well as, having roots outside the European Union, have clearly 
negative effects on income. 
Table 1 shows total inequality using the Theil 0 index, the IO indices, the 
percentage of total inequality represented by IO, the ranking based on the two measures 
and, finally, the sample size. We note, first, how a country’s rank can change 
significantly depending on whether total inequality or IO is considered. For example, 
                                                            
12 For our calculation, we assumed R = 1000. Cowell and Flachaire (2007) find that, in general, the 
bootstrap technique improves the numerical performance of the significance tests. Moreover, for small 
sample sizes, this technique yields a closer margin to the nominal confidence intervals (Davison and 
Hinkley, 2005). 
13 When an explanatory variable’s estimated coefficient is not shown, that is because there are no 
observations with that circumstance in the sample.   11
Sweden, France, Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Slovenia rank worse in terms of IO than 
total inequality. The opposite is true for countries like Germany, Finland, Belgium, 
Slovakia, Norway and Latvia. 
Secondly, we note how the Nordic countries are those with the lowest IO, while 
Mediterranean countries exhibit the largest.
14 In an intermediate position are the central 
European countries, while the countries of Eastern Europe show a wide range of IO’s. 
This arrangement can be easily seen in Figure 1, which ranks the European countries 
from smallest to largest IO. Lastly, we note that the average IO in Europe is 
approximately 9%, ranging from 2% in Denmark to 22% in Portugal.
15 What is more, 
we see that in percentage terms, the relative positions of the countries hold, with the 
exception of Hungary. 
 
Table 1. Inequality opportunity indices in Europe. 
(Standard errors in parentheses) 
Index Austria Belgium Czec  R. Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Ireland Italy
Theil 0 0,1203 0,2293 0,1196 0,0689 0,1985 0,1266 0,1096 0,1351 0,2127 0,1314 0,1874 0,1909
(0,0064) (0,1131) (0,0077) (0,0086) (0,0115) (0,0126) (0,0036) (0,0069) (0,0130) (0,0074) (0,0171) (0,0070)
IO 0,0063 0,0127 0,0072 0,0013 0,0218 0,0038 0,0097 0,0028 0,0230 0,0156 0,0250 0,0222
(0,0012) (0,0029) (0,0016) (0,0009) (0,0047) (0,0011) (0,0011) (0,0006) (0,0034) (0,0018) (0,0035) (0,0021)
Ratio (%) 5,24 5,54 6,02 1,89 10,98 3,00 8,85 2,07 10,81 11,87 13,34 11,63
(0,99) (4,31) (1,30) (0,96) (1,96) (0,89) (1,00) (0,45) (1,53) (1,30) (1,97) (1,00)
T0 position 72 0 6 1 1 58 51 21 71 0 1 3 1 4
IO position 71 2 8 1 1 531 121 71 3 1 9 1 6
N 2156 1839 1589 1241 1377 1981 3725 4256 2126 2590 1452 8640
Latvia Lithuania ND Norway Poland Portugal Spain Slovakia Slovenia Sweden UK
Theil 0 0,2995 0,2482 0,0884 0,1315 0,2671 0,2264 0,2144 0,1301 0,1095 0,0873 0,2047
(0,0242) (0,0144) (0,0051) (0,0187) (0,0072) (0,0112) (0,0081) (0,0084) (0,0156) (0,0057) (0,0148)
IO 0,0239 0,0358 0,0042 0,0048 0,0276 0,0503 0,0286 0,0047 0,0087 0,0084 0,0201
(0,0078) (0,0065) (0,0011) (0,0035) (0,0027) (0,0060) (0,0023) (0,0014) (0,0070) (0,0016) (0,0034)
Ratio (%) 7,98 14,42 4,75 3,65 10,33 22,22 13,34 3,61 7,95 9,62 9,82
(2,48) (2,15) (1,17) (2,36) (0,94) (2,21) (1,06) (0,97) (4,61) (1,84) (1,54)
T0 position 23 21 3 11 22 19 18 9 4 2 16
IO position 18 22 4 6 20 23 21 5 10 9 14
N 1159 1702 1695 1424 6056 1654 5389 2293 1342 1393 1875  
 
In light of these results, there is ample margin in Europe for implementing 
policies to reduce IO while at the same time maintaining individual effort and, by 
                                                            
14 A similar result using other databases was presented by Roemer et al. (2003) and Rodríguez (2008). 
15 It is interesting to note that Checchi and Peragine (2005) calculated a value below 10% for Italy, while 
Ferreira and Gignoux (2009) found percentages between 20% and 33% for six Latin American countries 
(Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Panama and Peru).   12
extension, economic growth. In Section 4 we evaluate some potential policies in view of 
events in Europe in the last decade, but before we offer a brief summary of the literature 
on the relationship between inequality and development. 
 






















































































































































































3. Background: the Kuznets hypothesis and the augmented Kuznets hypothesis 
The Kuznets hypothesis (1995) holds that economic development is a long-term 
determining factor in the inequality levels of an economy, this relationship having an 
inverted U shape. There is no theory, however, on which to base the long-term 
relationship that exists between development and IO. That is why, even though it is not 
the main goal of this article, we will make a few observations in this regard based on the 
arguments used by Kuznets in his proposal on total inequality. 
In the first stages of development, the important resources are land first, and then 
physical capital. These resources are highly concentrated, meaning that the output is 
obtained by few people. In this early stage, the aggregate inequality is small, but largely 
explained by IO since income is determined primarily by the initial conditions or the 
social origin of the individuals. As the economy develops, there is a shift in workers 
toward the industrial sector, which offers a greater range of salaries and opportunities. 
This results in wider salary dispersion and therefore increases total inequality   13
(representing the upslope portion of the inverted U), whereas IO decreases because 
individuals are given more opportunities. In this initial segment, an increase in 
inequality due to effort (and other possible factors) would more than offset the drop in 
IO.  
Later, the decreasing marginal productivity of capital (accumulated by a few) 
would diminish its performance, resulting in more capital being distributed to the 
population and in the salary difference between skilled and unskilled workers dropping. 
At the same time, IO would continue falling. The total inequality would thus decrease, 
since its two primary components would also be falling. This represents the downward 
slope of the inverted U. 
In the last three decades, however, aggregate inequality in the most developed 
countries has undergone an increase (see, for example, Atkinson, 1996). The 
proliferation of technology (Eicher, 1996, Aghion et al., 2002) and international trade 
deregulation (Wood and Ridao, 1996) are some of the factors used to explain this 
widening of salary differences. The factors that have served to trigger this increase in 
aggregate inequality, however, are more related to effort inequality than to IO. Our 
premise, then, is that IO always decreases with development. Kuznets’ inverted U (and 
the subsequent upturn in inequality) would then be explained by the trend in the effort-
driven inequality, and not so much by the trend in IO.  
In addition to a country’s degree of development, the evidence points to other 
factors that help to explain the inequality differences observed among countries. Along 
these lines, Milanovic (1994) proposed an augmented Kuznets hypothesis, in which 
inequality would be determined by ‘given’ (long-term) factors involving the country’s 
resources, the degree of development, social norms, etc., and by short-term factors, such 
as education, the functioning of the labor market, spending and tax policies, and so on. 
The ‘given’ factors would change slowly and would be difficult to modify in the short 
term, while the short-term factors would be more flexible and have potentially 
permanent effects. Milanovic’s work concluded that these short-term factors are more 
relevant in more developed countries, meaning less developed countries have a reduced 
capacity to lower aggregate inequality in the short term, since the ‘given’ factors are   14
more important.
16 Besides, the more advanced societies reduce their level of inequality 
not only for economic reasons, but also because they decide to have less inequality and 
implement policies to that end. Recently, Perugini and Martino (2008) characterized the 
factors that explain aggregate inequality among European regions, distinguishing also 
between long- and short-term factors. 
The goal of our work is to characterize those factors that exert the greatest 
influence on the IO levels observed in European countries. Unfortunately, there are no 
theoretical models available to us that distinguish among factors that affect aggregate 
inequality versus IO. Nor are there any empirical references that characterize the factors 
affecting IO. As a result, we will focus on those factors that have traditionally been used 
to characterize aggregate inequality: extent of economic development, public policies, 
education and the functioning of the labor market. So as to better understand our 
findings, we will compare them with those obtained for total inequality while noting the 
main differences found. 
 
4.  Economic and Policy Patterns of IO 
Our study considers INEQ, an index of inequality (total and IO) for 23 European 
countries in 2005 (see Section 2), as a dependent variable. Since our goal is to 
understand the explanatory factors of the differences observed in inequality among 
countries, the explanatory variables were measured prior to 2005. Specifically, we took 
1998 as a reference year, since numerous series started in that year.
17 See Appendix B 
for greater detail on the data used in this part of our research. This strategy also reduces 
any possible bias arising from problems with endogeneity and measurement errors 
(Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1991, and Partridge, 1997, among others), meaning the OLS 
procedure will be suitable. 
                                                            
16 Along similar lines, Tanzi (1998) writes on the determinants of inequality and distinguishes between 
market forces, social norms, the role of the government and ownership of capital (physical and human). 
He also underscores how the factors that determine inequality change as the country develops. In poor 
countries, social norms, economic development and ownership of tangible goods (land and physical 
capital) explain the inequality, while in rich countries, these factors become less important and are 
replaced by factors such as the distribution of human capital, economic changes (privatization, technical 
development, trade deregulation, etc.) and governmental policies. 
17 Whenever possible, we considered 1995 or 2000, though the results are very similar.   15
Due to our reduced sample size, we will estimate very parsimonious models. 
Based on the Kuznets hypothesis, we begin with the simplest model, which will include 
only the level of development of the countries (DEV) and a quadratic term: 
2
12 · ii i i INEQ DEV DEV            ( 9 )  
In the second group of models, in addition to the level of development, we will include 
each of the short-term factors to be considered, but on an individual basis. There are 
four of these factors in all: the functioning of the labor market, education levels, social 
protection spending and the tax system. In these ‘augmented models’, then, we will 
estimate a model for each factor X: 
2
12 ·· ii i i i INEQ DEV DEV X             (10) 
Note that the interpretation of coefficient  in (10) differs from that in a fully specified 
model, in which  would measure the partial effect that variable X exerts on inequality 
while keeping the remaining variables constant. In (10), however,  measures the global 
effect of X, corrected only by DEV and its quadratic term. The global effect is the sum 
of the partial effect and of all the other indirect effects arising from the correlation that 
exists between X and other variables affecting inequality and which are not included in 
the model.  
For our purpose, which is merely to characterize the differences in inequality 
based on policy, education, and other variables, the interpretation of these global 
coefficients is sufficient. Nevertheless, at the end of this section we will, for illustrative 
purposes, present the results of a more complete model where more explanatory 
variables are specified.
18 Lastly, in Section 5 we will conduct a statistical analysis, 
comparing the residuals of models (9) and (10) for the different explanatory variables 
considered, so as to add robustness to the results achieved in this section.  
 
4.1. Development  
There are many variables that can be used to reflect a country’s level of development. 
The most utilized are PPP-adjusted (purchasing power parity) per capita GDP, the 
percentage of jobs concentrated in the agriculture sector and the percentage of jobs 
                                                            
18 Due to the small number of degrees of freedom and to the possible colinearity among the factors 
considered, of vital importance will be noting the global adjustment attained by our regressions, since said 
adjustment is not affected by the low number of degrees of freedom.   16
concentrated in the services sector. Given these indicators’ high correlation, we will 
follow the strategy of Perugini and Martino (2008), who use the first principal 
component (PC) of these variables as an indicator of development. In our case, the first 
PC accounts for almost 90% of the join variability seen in 1998.
19 
Figures 2a and 2b show the scatter plots between total inequality and the 
development indicator, and the IO and the development indicator, respectively. Table 2 
shows the estimates for model (9). Based on these analyses, there is a negative 
relationship between inequality and development, which is consistent with being on the 
downslope of Kuznets’ inverted U. The quadratic fit, convex for total inequality and 
concave for IO, is not significant. If, however, we omit the countries with the least 
inequality (Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway), the convex relationship 
for total inequality becomes significant, while the relationship for IO remains linear and 
negative. These findings are consistent with the arguments given in the previous section 
on IO and on a possible upturn of total inequality by countries with high levels of 
development. These results are boosted when we include other explanatory variables in 
the model, as we will see in the following sub-sections. 
 















































































































19 Perugini and Martino (2008) also use population density as a development indicator. At the country 
level, however, we believe density is an inadequate indicator of development, given its dependence on the 
country’s surface area and the geographical dispersion among its regions. The density in regions of 
Finland, Sweden or Norway may be high, for example, but at the national level it is very low. In fact, 
their densities are much lower than those of Greece, Portugal or Spain, though they are by no means any 
less developed than the latter.   17
   Table 2. Development and Inequality 
 
In terms of IO, the focus of our attention, we note that every country in Eastern 
Europe, except for Lithuania, is below the regression curve, meaning that its IO levels 
are below what would be expected for their levels of development. Their Communist 
roots and the great opportunities created in these economies after the expansion of the 
EU could explain this situation, though factors involving education, the labor market 
and others could also have an effect, as we shall see in the following sub-sections. 
Among the most developed countries, there are three clearly distinguishable groups: 
Denmark, Finland, Austria, Germany, Norway and the Netherlands, whose IO levels are 
less than expected based on their levels of development; the United Kingdom, Italy, 
Ireland, Spain, Portugal and, to a lesser extent, Belgium, whose IO levels are higher 
than expected; and, Sweden, France and Greece, which are very close to regression. 
Despite having found certain geographical and developmental patterns common among 
European countries, much remains to be explained in terms of the differences noted in 
inequality and IO for these countries. 
 
4.2.  Labor market performance 
From a theoretical standpoint, the relationship between the labor market and inequality 
is complex and inconclusive (Burniauz et al., 2006). On the one hand, better functioning 
of the labor market involves less exclusion, and therefore less inequality. This same 
reasoning could be applied to IO if the labor market favored the inclusion of those 
population sectors that had, a priori, fewer opportunities, such as immigrants, youth and 
women. On the other hand, labor inclusion could place pressure on less-qualified 
Total inequality Inequality of 
Opportunity














Standard deviation in parentheses
Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10%(*)  18
employees as a whole, increasing salary differences between this group and that of more 
qualified workers (Topel, 1994). 
There is a large number of variables involving the functioning of the labor 
market (see Appendix B). Following Perugini and Martino (2008), we consider as an 
aggregate measure of the functioning of this market the first principal component 
(Labor_MK_PC) of the following four variables: total employment rate, total 
unemployment rate, female employment rate and long-term unemployment.
20 We note, 
however, that the first two reflect aggregate aspects of the labor market, while the last 
two capture more concrete and structural aspects. Distinguishing between them is an 
interesting undertaking, since those policies aimed at people with worse circumstances 
should have a greater influence on IO. That is why we have also conducted a detailed 
analysis for each of these four variables separately. In addition, we consider the 
following differential unemployment rates: for those aged above and below 40 and for 
workers with considerable schooling (secondary or university education) and those with 
little education (primary or none).
21 These differentials may be interpreted as proxies for 
premiums to age (or experience) and education, respectively. 
Graphs 3a and 3b show the relationship between total inequality and IO with 
Labor_MK_PC. Note that for IO, Portugal is far above the regression line, which could 
affect the parameter estimates. That is why Tables 3a and 3b show the estimates of 
model (10) for aggregate inequality and IO, respectively, with and without the Portugal 
dummy variable. 
Firstly, we note how, in effect, the model with the Portugal dummy variable 
considerably improves the significance of the labor maket variables with respect to IO. 
Secondly, the results when using the aggregate variable Labor_MK_PC indicate that a 
better functioning of the labor market would help to reduce inequality and IO. Thirdly, 
female employment and long-term unemployment, with negative and positive 
coefficients, respectively, are clearly more significant and robust to the inclusion or 
omission of the Portugal dummy variable than are the total unemployment and 
employment rates. Our results, therefore, indicate that those variables associated with 
                                                            
20 The first principal component accounts for almost 90% of the joint variability in these variables for 
1998.  
21 We have also considered the difference in unemployment between men and women, though the results 
were not significant.    19
the structure of the labor market have a greater effect on IO than the aggregate 
variables. To comment further on this, we also note the results for the differences in 
unemployment rate by age groups and educational level (see the last four columns of 
Tables 3a and 3b). 
 









































































































The difference in unemployment rate by age exhibits a positive coefficient in 
both cases, but is significant for IO only when the Portugal dummy variable is included. 
This result, although weak, indicates that combatting unemployment among the young 
and reducing any potential gap that may exist with adult unemployment figures could 
help to improve IO. As for the unemployment rate between more and less educated 
individuals, the coefficient is negative in both cases, though it is especially significant 
for IO. One conclusion that may be drawn from this is that a labor market that favors 
better educated workers would promote the acquisition of human capital, would reduce 




Table 3a. Labor market and total inequality 
 
Table 3b. Labor market and inequality of opportunity 
 
 
4.3.  Education 
In theory, higher levels of education should help to balance the initial distribution of 
human capital, and thereby to reduce one of the main causes of inequality in developed 
economies (Tanzi, 1998). The variables considered for measuring education are those 
commonly employed in the literature (see, for example, Barro, 2000): the population 




































































































































R2 0.581 0.636  0.524 0.608 0.506 0.578 0.594 0.650 0.563 0.598 0.491 0.534 0.489 0.500
R2‐adj. 0.515 0.555  0.449 0.521 0.428 0.484 0.530 0.572 0.493 0.509 0.410 0.430 0.408 0.389
Standard deviation  in parentheses
Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10%(*)




































































































































R2 0.3948 0.7130 0.3502 0.6705  0.3502 0.6654 0.4079 0.7304 0.4054 0.6899 0.3743  0.6877 0.5431 0.6823
R2‐adj.  0.2992 0.6492 0.2476 0.5972  0.2476 0.5910 0.3144 0.6705 0.3115 0.6210 0.2755  0.6184 0.4710 0.6117
Standard deviation in parentheses
Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10%(*)
Dif. unemp. Education Labor Mk PC  Unempl. rate Empl. rate Empl. rate fem. Long‐run unemp.  Dif. unemp. Age  21
15, which we call Second (ISCED levels 3-6); the population with at least a university 
education as a percentage of the population older than 15, which we call Tertiary 
(ISCED levels 5-6); the percentage of women who attain secondary education (Second 
Fem.); lastly, we also consider a less used, but very important, variable, that of dropouts 
(Early Leaves), which measures the percentage of the population between the ages of 
18-24 with only some or no secondary education. As in the above cases, we can 













































































































Graphs 4a and 4b show the scatter plots for Education PC, total inequality and 
IO. The fit is negative in both cases, though it is much better for IO. We note the good 
fit for IO for Greece, Spain, the United Kingdom and Hungary, as well the improvement 
for Ireland and especially Portugal, the result for which was clearly anomalous in Graph 
3b. Although no scatter plot is shown for the Early Leaves variable, the nearly perfect 
fit for Portugal is worth noting. Tables 4a and 4b summarize the results of the 
regressions. As in the previous cases, we consider the development variable, its 
quadratic term and we include the education variables one by one. 
 
                                                            
22 The first main component accounts for almost 90% of the joint variability in these variables for 1998.   22
Table 4a. Education and total inequality 
 
Table 4b. Education and IO 
 
We note first how, once educational levels are taken into account, the 
relationship between development and total inequality is U-shaped (see the positive and 
significant quadratic term), while the relationship between development and IO remains 
negative and significant, though the quadratic term is clearly not significant. This result 
is consistent with the argument made in Section 3 and sub-section 4.1. Secondly, we 














































R2  0.640 0.643 0.612 0.691 0.511
















































R2 0.7843 0.7871 0.7328 0.8509 0.4042 
R2‐adj. 0.7503 0.7535 0.6906 0.8274 0.3101 
Standard deviation in parentheses
Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10%(*)  23
significant, especially those involving academic dropouts. This is reflected in the 
elevated values of R
2 (and adjusted R
2) and in its notable improvement attained when 
included the education variables (compare with results in Table 2). In general, these 
differences are much more salient in the case of IO. For example, the R
2 for the IO 
model when the Early Leaves variable is included in the regression exceeds 85%. 
Tertiary education is the only variable that is more significant in explaining the 
differences in terms of total inequality than in terms of IO. Nevertheless, its sign is 
positive in both cases, in contrast to the sign for secondary education. 
In light of these results, preventing dropouts and attaining a level of secondary 
education would help to balance the initial distribution of human capital and to 
significantly reduce total inequality, and especially IO. Tertiary education, however, by 
complementing innovation and technological change (Aghion et al., 1999), would 
increase income differences (Perugini and Martino, 2008). This variable would have a 
small effect on IO, though it would influence total inequality by increasing the effort 
component of inequality. 
 
4.4.  Public Expenditure in Social Protection and Taxes 
Public spending on social protection is the most direct way available to the public sector 
to reduce inequality. What is not as obvious is whether the various outlays 
(unemployment benefits, child care, health care, disability, etc.) have the same effect on 
inequality. It might even be the case that some have an effect on total inequality but not 
on IO. As an aggregate variable, we consider the total spending on social protection as a 
percentage of the GDP. Moreover, we consider the different items of expenditure 
individually, all measured as a percentage of GDP: child care, disability, social 
exclusion, health care, pensions and unemployment. 
Graphs 5a and 5b show the scatter plots between total spending, total inequality 
and IO. Note that for both aggregate inequality and IO, the fit is negative and 
significant. For IO, the case of Portugal stands out once more, since it is far above the 
regression line. On this occasion, however, the inclusion of the Portugal dummy 
variable does not significantly change the estimates for the public spending variable,   24
and so it was not included in the analysis. Tables 5a and 5b show the estimates of model 
(10) for total inequality and IO, respectively. 
 
   Figure 5a. Total social expenditure          Figure 5b. Total social expenditure and IO                 







































































































We first see that some items have a greater explanatory power than others. If we 
focus on IO, the expenditures that best explain the differences are for child care, social 
inclusion and health care. The remaining items (unemployment benefits, pensions, 
disability and work leave) are not significant. For total inequality, the significant items 
are disability and work leave, in addition to those for IO. Once again unemployment 
benefits and pensions are not significant. It should be noted, therefore, that child care, 
social inclusion and health care are the most important items to improve opportunities. 
In contrast, unemployment benefits, pensions and expenses incurred by disability and 
work leave influence not so much opportunity, as they do the redistribution of income in 
general. 
In the last part of this sub-section we analyze the possible effect of the tax 
scheme. Once again, for reasons of parsimony, we will simplify the exercise and 
consider only two types of tax, grouping indirect taxes on consumption (VAT) and 
imports on one side, which represented an average of approximately 7.4% of the GDP   25
in 1998 for the countries analyzed, and income and capital taxes on the other, 
representing 14.5% of the GDP on average. 
 
Table 5a. Social public expenditure and total inequality 
 
Table 5b. Social public expenditure and IO 
 



























































R2  0.628 0.590 0.571 0.663 0.602 0.484 0.471 
R2‐adj.  0.569 0.525 0.503 0.610 0.540 0.403 0.387 
Standard deviation in parentheses 
Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10%(*)



























































R2 0.463  0.559 0.378 0.464 0.404 0.374 0.361
R2‐adj. 0.378  0.489 0.280 0.379 0.310 0.275 0.261
Standard deviation in parentheses
Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10%(*)  26
If we focus solely on the relationship that exists between inequality (total and 
IO) and these tax items, we find a weak connection, the corresponding scatter plots (not 
shown) exhibit a large dispersion. When we estimate the linear model using only the 
development variables and the tax items (not shown), we find that these are not 
significant in any of the cases. What is relevant, however, is analyzing the effect of the 
tax structure not by itself, but with reference to the total amount of social protection 
spending. The regression results in these cases are shown in Table 5c. 
 
Table 5c. Social public expenditure, taxes and inequality 
 
 
First, we find that the total expenditure variable remains negative, with similar 
coefficients and very significant. Secondly, given the country’s level of development 
and the extent of social protection spending, those countries with a tax structure based 
primarily on indirect taxes tend to exhibit a lower IO, while those countries that rely 
more heavily on financing through direct taxes show a greater IO. Lastly, for total 
inequality, the effect of taxes on indirect taxes persists, while that of income taxes 































4.5.  A fully specified model for IO 
Despite the existing problems involving degrees of freedom and colinearity, it is still 
illustrative to present the results of a fully-specified model that includes the aggregate 
variables corresponding to each of the factors considered over the course of this section. 
In Table 6 we show the regressions for total inequality and for IO. We first note the 
very high value of the adjusted R
2, which exceeds 85% for the IO model and reaches 
almost 70% for the total inequality model. If we compare the adjusted R
2 for the 
complete IO model with just the development variable (Table 2), its value has more 
than doubled. 
The development coefficient is negative and significant for both total inequality 
and IO. Labor_MK_PC, on the other hand, is not significant in either case. If we 
compare this result with that obtained in Section 4.2, the negative sign and the 
significance found in that section resulted from the indirect effect of the labor market 
variable (through its relationship with educational levels and/or spending policies), 
since the partial effect of this variable on inequality appears to be non-significant. The 
negative effect of the education variable remains for IO, while results non-significant 
for total inequality. Improving education, therefore, is one of the keys to reducing IO. 
The social spending item has a negative bearing on total inequality and IO. Yet again, as 
noted in Section 4.4, we see that public spending policy can have a notable impact on 
reducing both total inequality and IO. Lastly, taxes lose their explanatory power, save 
for that of indirect taxes on total inequality, though the signs remain the same. 
Colinearity affects the estimates and significancce of the individual variables, 
but not the R
2 statistics or OLS residuals. The interpretation of the residuals in these 
broader models is interesting. They show what is left to explain for IO and total 
inequality once the aggregate labor market, education and policy variables are taken 
into consideration. Accordingly, we conclude this section comparing the residuals of the 
complete model for total inequality and IO (Figure 6). We note first a positive 
correlation between these residuals. This means that there are factors common to both 
total inequality and IO that could help to explain what remains to be explained for both 
inequality meassures. However, we also see a notable dispersion, symptomatic of 
elements that are exclusive to each inequality type. Also evident is the fact that the   28
countries are fairly well mixed, a sign that there are no geographical patterns or fixed 
factors by country groups like those found in Figures 2a and 2b. 
 
           Table 6. A fully-specified model for total inequality and IO 
 







































































































In summary, we have a set of countries on the one hand for which the complete 
model helps to explain practically all of its inequality and IO (those about the origins of 
the X-Y axes). These include Poland, Austria, France, Italy, Ireland, Hungary, the 
Netherlands and Spain. On the other, there is a set of countries whose inequality and IO 
are below those predicted by the models, such as the Czech Republic, Slovenia, 
Denmark and Slovakia. The opposite occurs in Estonia, Belgium, Norway, the United 
Kingdom and Germany. And, finally, there are countries whose residuals are well 
behaved for only one of the inequality variables, such as Sweden, Lithuania, Greece and 
Finland. 
 
5. Robustness and comparison of results 
The purpose of this section is to offer an alternative analysis to that made in the 
previous section so as to provide the results with robustness. In each case, we will 
compare the residuals of model (9) with those of model (10) for every one of the 
explanatory variables considered. When the residuals are plotted on a scatter plot, the 
bisector indicates that the variable X included in (10) adds no information to the 
development indicator (model (9)). On the other hand, the distance to the bisector 
indicates the additional explanatory capacity of the variable X. In addition to 
complementing the contrasts of the individual significances, these graphs also illustrate 
each country’s particular cases by enabling a country-by-country comparison of the 
change in the residuals. Due to space considerations, the similarities in these two sets of 
residuals are summarized in a statistic for each case, with the scatter plots only being 
shown for the more significant cases in Appendix C. Figure 7 shows the Spearman rank 
correlation coefficient between the residuals of the basic model (9) and the augmented 
model (10) for the different explanatory variables considered.
 23 
The correlations are expected to be positive, and indeed they are, but the less the 
correlation, the greater the explanatory capacity of variable X. Based on these 
correlations, we can draw the following conclusions. In general, the labor market 
variables have a similar effect on total inequality and IO. Moreover, their effect is the 
least relevant of all those studied. The main differences are evident in the age- and 
education-related unemployment rate differentials, where the correlation is lower for IO. 
                                                            
23 The results do not change when the Pearson correlation coefficient is used. Both coefficients range 
from -1 to 1.   30
For IO in particular, the education variables have a very noticeable effect on the model 
residuals, such that the estimated correlations are the smallest from among all the cases 
considered. In this regard, the variables that exhibit the lowest correlations are those for 
secondary education and dropout rate. These are also the variables that have the largest 
difference between the total inequality model and IO. As for the tertiary education 
variable, it does not appear as though the residuals differ much from those of the model 
without this variable. With regard to social public spending, there is a noticeable 
heterogeneity in the estimated correlations by type of expenditure. Spending on child 
care has the greatest effect on the range of residuals for IO, and is the only item whose 
correlation is less for IO than for total inequality. Unemployment and retirement 
spending, the correlations are very high (very close to 1) and similar in both cases. 
Lastly, once the total expenditure is included, the tax structure seems to have an effect 
on the correlations for both total inequality and IO. All of these findings appear to 
confirm the main results from the previous section. 
 













6. Concluding remarks 
Traditionally public economic policies have been evaluated from two perspectives: 
efficiency, which attempts to determine which policies have the greatest effect on 
productivity and economic growth; and equality, which studies, for example, the effects 
of a fiscal system on the final income distribution. Both approaches are based on the 
assumption that efficiency and equality are two components of the economy that can be 
analyzed separately. In general, equality is disregarded in efficiency analyses, while 
economic incentives and the level of effort are not considered in studies on equality. A 
new concept, however, which first appeared in the economic literature in the early 
nineties, attempts to combine these two aspects. 
The modern economy of justice recognizes an individual’s income as being a 
function of the effort made and of the initial circumstances affecting the individual. And 
yet, individuals are only responsible for their own efforts, since the circumstances 
remain beyond their control. Thus, a greater inequality in the distribution of income 
does not imply, per se, that the course of the economy in general, or the redistributive 
capacity of a public policy in particular, is bad. It may happen that the level of effort 
made by individuals is different. In fact, a country’s fiscal policy could correct the 
uneven distribution of initial circumstances while at the same time respecting the 
individual labor supply. For this to happen, a public policy must be implemented that, 
far from simply redistributing income, provides every individual with the same initial 
conditions without modifying the economic incentives to maximize effort. 
With regard to this kind of policy, our findings highlight educational policies 
first and foremost. In particular, a reduction in the academic dropout rate constitutes a 
fundamental tool to increasing the opportunities available in an economy. Reaching 
secondary education levels would also help to reduce IO indices. Tertiary education 
does not seem to have a significant impact on IO, though it would on aggregate 
inequality, though its impact would be positive, thus promoting inequality arising from 
effort instead of from opportunity. 
A second pillar on which any policy aimed at reducing IO should be based is 
social protection spending, though not all items of expenditure would have the same 
effect. Spending to reduce social exclusion and on child and health care would have the 
greatest effect in terms of reducing IO, while expenses on unemployment benefits, 
retirement and disability do not appear to have any significance on improving IO. With   32
respect to financing these expenses, both direct and indirect taxes appear to have little 
effect on IO. Variables that consider the functioning of the labor market do not help to 
explain the differences in IO among the European countries analyzed. Nevertheless, 
increasing female employment rate, reducing long-term unemployment and increasing 
the differential between poorly and highly educated individuals would prove beneficial 
for an economy’s IO. Lastly, a country’s level of development has a clearly negative 
influence on IO, though no evidence was noted to suggest a quadratic inverted-U 
relationship. 
This paper have attempted to lay the empirical foundations for a theoretical 
study that will help us to understand the various mechanisms through which 
educational, economic and policy factors might explain the levels of IO that exist 
among countries. In addition to continuing to enhance the empirical evidence, the 
development of this theoretical framework would naturally be the most promising and 
ambitious extension of this paper.   33
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APPENDIX  A  
Variables Austria Belgium Czec R. Denmark Estonia Finland France
Primary education (F) -0.018 0.182 0.506 0.072*
(0.062) (0.278) (0.379) (0.041)
Secondary education (F) 1.111** 0.013 0.240 -0.015 0.141 0.553 0.091**
(0.516) (0.061) (0.186) (0.047) (0.276) (0.390) (0.043)
Terciary education (F) 1.031* 0.028 0.318 0.308 0.629 0.152***
(0.525) (0.070) (0.192) (0.281) (0.391) (0.052)
Primary education (M) 0.058 0.198 -0.107 -0.296 0.077*
(0.060) (0.341) (0.217) (0.388) (0.041)
Secondary education (M) 0.136** 0.174 0.070* 0.094 -0.228 0.142***
(0.058) (0.185) (0.041) (0.215) (0.399) (0.044)
Terciary education (M) 0.152** 0.273 0.229 -0.201 0.205***
(0.067) (0.191) (0.219) (0.399) (0.051)
Manager (F) 0.134** 0.047 0.182** 0.068 0.220* 0.168*** 0.202***
(0.058) (0.070) (0.083) (0.059) (0.124) (0.049) (0.034)
Proffesional (F) 0.225* 0.045 0.222** 0.030 0.167 0.073 0.150***
(0.119) (0.073) (0.083) (0.067) (0.131) (0.054) (0.037)
Technician (F) 0.128*** -0.027 0.136** 0.014 0.241* 0.063 0.191***
(0.043) (0.075) (0.065) (0.060) (0.135) (0.042) (0.034)
Clerk (F) 0.110** 0.014 0.246** -0.013 0.309 0.048 0.114***
(0.053) (0.070) (0.089) (0.075) (0.225) (0.084) (0.038)
Salesman (F) 0.033 0.020 0.050 0.031 0.341* 0.077 0.057
(0.044) (0.075) (0.083) (0.066) (0.203) (0.060) (0.045)
Craft trade worker (F) 0.015 -0.019 0.066 -0.058 0.115 0.023 0.057**
(0.036) (0.062) (0.061) (0.047) (0.113) (0.033) (0.026)
Machine operator (F) -0.025 -0.027 0.064 -0.051 0.002 0.037 0.049*
(0.049) (0.069) (0.064) (0.060) (0.113) (0.036) (0.027)
Elementary occupation (F) -0.087** -0.038 -0.106 -0.008 -0.045 -0.023 -0.007
(0.041) (0.068) (0.076) (0.055) (0.127) (0.064) (0.034)
Armed occupation (F) 0.528 0.033 0.102 0.072 -0.129 0.224 0.148***
(0.362) (0.097) (0.130) (0.157) (0.190) (0.133) (0.046)
Difficulties most of the time -0.385*** -0.198*** -0.032 -0.152 0.001
(0.069) (0.066) (0.098) (0.127) (0.056)
Difficulties often -0.151*** -0.080* 0.031 -0.127* -0.036
(0.055) (0.045) (0.071) (0.068) (0.044)
Difficulties occasionally -0.14137**-0.034 0.040 0.031 0.012
(0.037) (0.031) (0.040) (0.048) (0.028)
Difficulties rarely -0.085** 0.003 0.023 0.073 -0.009
(0.038) (0.031) (0.037) (0.052) (0.028)
EU 0.041 -0.028 0.050 0.178 0.015 -0.021
(0.067) (0.052) (0.091) (0.151) (0.104) (0.039)
Other -0.288*** -0.347*** -0.294*** -0.095 -0.056 -0.222* -0.238***
(0.040) (0.051) (0.126) (0.103) (0.062) (0.114) (0.031)
Constant 8.654*** 9.748*** 7.924*** 9.995*** 7.648*** 9.448*** 9.470***
(0.517) (0.070) (0.231) (0.068) (0.308) (0.314) (0.044)
Observations 2156 1839 1589 1241 1377 1981 3725
R-squared 0.05 0.10 0.06 0.01 0.09 0.03 0.09
Standard errors in parenthesis. * significant at 10 %; ** significant at 5 %; *** significant at 1 %.
Omitted categories are: less than primary education; skill agricultural, forestry and fishery worker; never; local.
Table 1A. Reduced-form OLS regression of household income on circumstances
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Variables Germany Greece Hungary Ireland Italy Latvia Lithuania
Primary education (F) -0.127* 0.105* -0.003 0.125 0.186*** -0.342 0.371***
(0.064) (0.054) (0.135) (0.155) (0.032) (0.310) (0.105)
Secondary education (F) 0.048** 0.231*** 0.017 0.247 0.226*** -0.112 0.377***
(0.020) (0.073) (0.135) (0.156) (0.037) (0.311) (0.110)
Terciary education (F) 0.086 0.041 0.216 0.373*** 0.078 0.511***
(0.104) (0.142) (0.160) (0.068) (0.326) (0.126)
Primary education (M) 0.084 0.391*** -0.082 0.127*** 0.899*** -0.023
(0.051) (0.114) (0.167) (0.028) (0.277) (0.096)
Secondary education (M) 0.192*** 0.147* 0.493*** 0.100 0.190*** 0.932*** 0.012
(0.049) (0.073) (0.114) (0.167) (0.034) (0.273) (0.101)
Terciary education (M) 0.150*** 0.365*** 0.574*** 0.076 0.294*** 1.023*** 0.256**
(0.053) (0.100) (0.119) (0.172) (0.079) (0.285) (0.110)
Manager (F) 0.139*** 0.169*** 0.358*** 0.272* 0.075* 0.252 0.288**
(0.046) (0.060) (0.055) (0.141) (0.038) (0.209) (0.126)
Proffesional (F) 0.145*** 0.232** 0.395*** 0.378** 0.092 0.280 0.127
(0.042) (0.105) (0.061) (0.151) (0.063) (0.209) (0.124)
Technician (F) 0.052 0.302** 0.275*** 0.353** 0.098** 0.282 0.165
(0.041) (0.125) (0.053) (0.162) (0.042) (0.211) (0.149)
Clerk (F) 0.026 0.172* 0.209*** 0.342** 0.055 -0.287 0.397**
(0.045) (0.085) (0.062) (0.149) (0.045) (0.302) (0.161)
Salesman (F) 0.108* 0.003 0.168** 0.330** -0.023 0.311 0.401**
(0.057) (0.083) (0.062) (0.151) (0.049) (0.255) (0.169)
Craft trade worker (F) 0.005 0.124** 0.146*** 0.214 0.003 0.104 0.153
(0.037) (0.051) (0.035) (0.141) (0.030) (0.180) (0.097)
Machine operator (F) 0.015 0.064 0.099** 0.217 0.102*** 0.191 0.015
(0.042) (0.069) (0.038) (0.144) (0.034) (0.179) (0.099)
Elementary occupation (F) 0.077 0.005 -0.040 0.152 -0.138*** 0.139 -0.035
(0.049) (0.062) (0.042) (0.141) (0.034) (0.191) (0.099)
Armed occupation (F) 0.077 0.153 0.176** 0.173 0.182** 0.168 0.094
(0.084) (0.181) (0.081) (0.172) (0.067) (0.272) (0.243)
Difficulties most of the time -0.102** -0.271*** -0.196*** -0.003 -0.15*
(0.038) (0.061) (0.033) (0.136) (0.083)
Difficulties often -0.090*** -0.264*** -0.166*** 0.003 -0.042
(0.031) (0.059) (0.030) (0.095) (0.066)
Difficulties occasionally -0.017 -0.155*** -0.081*** -0.039 -0.028
(0.031) (0.040) (0.027) (0.073) (0.054)
Difficulties rarely -0.024 -0.139*** -0.065** 0.011 0.013
(0.026) (0.038) (0.029) (0.080) (0.060)
EU 0.132 0.026 -0.147 -0.455*** 0.006
(0.113) (0.173) (0.049) (0.073) (0.340)
Other -0.111** -0.495*** -0.062 -0.265*** -0.270*** -0.137 0.006
(0.040) (0.067) (0.067) (0.076) (0.037) (0.088) (0.089)
Constant 9.528*** 8.934*** 7.547*** 9.672*** 9.3568*** 6.747*** 7.139***
(0.062) (0.039) (0.138) (0.180) (0.040) (0.354) (0.143)
Observations 4256 2126 2590 1452 8640 1159 1702
R-squared 0.02 0.07 0.12 0.14 0.07 0.05 0.10
Standard errors in parenthesis. * significant at 10 %; ** significant at 5 %; *** significant at 1 %.
Omitted categories are: less than primary education; skill agricultural, forestry and fishery worker; never; local.
Table 1A. Reduced-form OLS regression of household income on circumstances (Cont.)
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Variables ND Norway Poland Portugal Spain Slovakia
Primary education (F) -0.161*** 0.067 0.219*** 0.178***
(0.041) (0.055) (0.041) (0.039)
Secondary education (F) -0.094*** 0.087 0.365*** 0.234*** 0.006
(0.033) (0.058) (0.086) (0.053) (0.074)
Terciary education (F) -0.016 0.094 0.728*** 0.254*** 0.085
(0.041) (0.086) (0.149) (0.064) (0.086)
Primary education (M) 0.057 0.116*** 0.155***
(0.052) (0.038) (0.037)
Secondary education (M) 0.016 -0.037 0.209*** 0.179* 0.237*** 0.089
(0.028) (0.040) (0.054) (0.101) (0.053) (0.070)
Terciary education (M) -0.022 0.348*** 0.308*** 0.302*** 0.176**
(0.047) (0.072) (0.111) (0.070) (0.086)
Manager (F) 0.110 0.027 0.256*** 0.385*** 0.108* 0.150**
(0.091) (0.073) (0.064) (0.068) (0.055) (0.075)
Proffesional (F) 0.087 0.011 0.445*** 0.256 0.256*** 0.200**
(0.096) (0.080) (0.077) (0.159) (0.080) (0.079)
Technician (F) 0.173* -0.003 0.257*** 0.446*** 0.329*** 0.177**
(0.093) (0.068) (0.050) (0.092) (0.063) (0.072)
Clerk (F) 0.187* 0.152 0.204*** 0.287*** 0.210*** 0.193**
(0.097) (0.096) (0.063) (0.079) (0.058) (0.089)
Salesman (F) 0.004 -0.018 0.085 0.331*** 0.107** 0.144
(0.101) (0.095) (0.072) (0.073) (0.051) (0.089)
Craft trade worker (F) 0.106 -0.038 0.132*** 0.125*** 0.056 0.103
(0.091) (0.065) (0.031) (0.043) (0.038) (0.067)
Machine operator (F) 0.102 0.039 0.140*** 0.100* 0.169*** 0.080
(0.094) (0.071) (0.034) (0.055) (0.045) (0.067)
Elementary occupation (F) 0.076 0.004 0.031 0.127** 0.043 0.000
(0.102) (0.178) (0.041) (0.056) (0.040) (0.070)
Armed occupation (F) 0.067 -0.076 0.350*** 0.534*** 0.228**
(0.127) (0.185) (0.089) (0.139) (0.092)
Difficulties most of the time -0.148** -0.041 -0.240*** -0.089* -0.007
(0.072) (0.130) (0.044) (0.045) (0.070)
Difficulties often -0.057 -0.029 -0.163*** -0.098** -0.017
(0.045) (0.092) (0.034) (0.042) (0.069)
Difficulties occasionally -0.056* -0.103* -0.057** -0.162*** -0.051
(0.032) (0.053) (0.027) (0.031) (0.069)
Difficulties rarely -0.022 -0.046 -0.047 -0.051 -0.062
(0.028) (0.040) (0.031) (0.030) (0.073)
EU 0.106 0.101 0.252 -0.173 -0.349*** 0.161
(0.099) (0.093) (0.459) (0.129) (0.046) (0.106)
Other -0.213*** -0.373*** -0.372 -0.147 -0.673*** -0.137
(0.055) (0.084) (0.282) (0.101) (0.159) (0.159)
Constant 9.798*** 10.209*** 7.544*** 8.543*** 8.960*** 7.771***
(0.096) (0.067) (0.040) (0.036) (0.041) (0.102)
Observations 1695 1424 6056 1654 5389 2293
R-squared 0.04 0.03 0.08 0.20 0.08 0.04
Standard errors in parenthesis. * significant at 10 %; ** significant at 5 %; *** significant at 1 %.
Omitted categories are: less than primary education; skill agricultural, forestry and fishery worker; never; local.
Table 1A. Reduced-form OLS regression of household income on circumstances (Cont.)
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Variables Slovenia Sweden UK
Primary education (F) -0.150 0.176**
(0.237) (0.087)
Secondary education (F) -0.204 0.246** 0.153***
(0.239) (0.088) (0.051)
Terciary education (F) -0.064 0.210* 0.194***
(0.241) (0.109) (0.046)
Primary education (M) -0.011 -0.126
(0.198) (0.074)
Secondary education (M) 0.072 -0.062 0.161***
(0.200) (0.077) (0.044)
Terciary education (M) 0.026 -0.064 0.116**
(0.203) (0.096) (0.049)
Manager (F) 0.284*** 0.261**
(0.077) (0.103)
Proffesional (F) 0.127 0.188*
(0.087) (0.105)
Technician (F) 0.173*** 0.111
(0.057) (0.109)
Clerk (F) 0.088 0.007
(0.065) (0.124)
Salesman (F) 0.115* 0.178
(0.063) (0.123)
Craft trade worker (F) 0.008 0.082
(0.044) (0.098)
Machine operator (F) 0.029 0.085
(0.043) (0.100)
Elementary occupation (F) 0.009 0.043
(0.058) (0.102)
Armed occupation (F) 0.243*
(0.134)
Difficulties most of the time 0.122 0.010 -0.104
(0.108) (0.049) (0.065)
Difficulties often 0.041 0.026 -0.001
(0.088) (0.042) (0.058)
Difficulties occasionally 0.032 0.024 0.073
(0.061) (0.038) (0.043)




Other -0.474*** -0.179*** -0.228***
(0.083) (0.043) (0.052)
Constant 9.889*** 8.942*** 9.750***
(0.171) (0.082) (0.096)
Observations 1342 1393 1875
R-squared 0.04 0.08 0.08
Standard errors in parenthesis. * significant at 10 %; ** significant at 5 %; *** significant at 1 %.
Omitted categories are: less than primary education; skill agricultural, forestry and fishery worker; never; local.
United Kingdom: occupation variables are refered to mother's occupation.
Table 1A. Reduced-form OLS regression of household income on circumstances (Cont.)
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